Related Resources:
FOIA Request to CDC, 22 Jan 2005The Sunshine Project
News Release
31 January 2005Tularemia Outbreak: CDC Refuses Rapid Response
Cold Comfort for Communities Confronting Biodefense Labs
(Austin, 31 Jan 2005) - Don't count on the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to tell the public about biological weapons accidents. CDC's refusal to divulge information about the Boston University tularemia incidents will come as cold comfort for the tens of millions in the US who live close to (proposed) biological weapons labs, according to the Sunshine Project.
Tularemia infections related to NIH-funded bioweapons research at Boston University have recently made international headlines; but last week CDC refused a legal request to divulge what it knew, and what it knows, about the circumstances that led to the biological weapons accidents.
On January 22nd, the Sunshine Project filed an Expedited Freedom of Information Act Request that asked for the dates on which Boston University researchers and labs were first permitted to work with virulent strains of tularemia. It also requested immediate release of CDC correspondence with Boston University during May and June 2004, when the first, apparently undetected, tularemia infections occurred. Understanding the dates of permits under the US select agent rules and Boston University's relationship with CDC might reveal important information about the accidents.
But CDC rejected the request on January 25th. It sent its reply by US Mail, which took four days to arrive. In its refusal, CDC made a dubious determination under the law. In order to delay its response for months or more, CDC determined that there is no urgent need to inform the public about the tularemia accidents nor a reasonable expectation that release of the requested information would ameliorate a threat human life and safety - namely, Boston University's biological weapons research.
CDC (Atlanta, GA) and the NIH Office of Biotechnology Activities (OBA) in Bethesda, MD, are the two US government offices that are, insofar as rules exist, in charge of the safety of civilian biological weapons research. Unlike many aspects of laboratory biosafety, permits for work with virulent tularemia are a legal requirement. The United States does not have comprehensive biosafety and laboratory accident reporting laws.
The Sunshine Project has been calling for comprehensive federal biosafety law mandating accident reporting and public disclosure since last year, when it published a lengthy report detailing the sorry state of US biosafety committees.
"Boston University's tularemia problems have popped the balloon of bloated and distorted safety claims about the biodefense program," says Sunshine Project Director Edward Hammond, "CDC secrecy about biological weapons accidents will shake remaining confidence in laboratory safety not only in Boston; but nationwide. By rejecting disclosure, CDC is signaling intent to continue with the status quo of indifference, underreporting and secrecy. The solution is to reign in the sprawling and palpably dangerous biodefense program and to mandate reporting and prompt public disclosure of laboratory accidents.