Sunshine: Report on the Biodefense Research of the German Army

The Sunshine Project
Backgrounder Series #7, June 2001

Biological Weapons

Research Projects of the German Army

by Jan van Aken

English Summary

Since 1995, the biodefense research of the German Army has been massively developed. The budget for bioweapons research is increasing above average when compared to the total defense budget. This defense-offensive in the test tube is directly connected to the new orientation of the German Army on operations outside Germany. According to the assessment of the defense ministry the bioweapons threat has increased, not because bacterial bombs are anticipated to be delivered on Munich or Berlin; but because "crisis reaction forces" will be in foreign areas with a higher threat of BW exposure. Thus – as the defense ministry put it – an "unsatisfied demand" exists that is currently to be filled by the research laboratories of the German Army and NATO. Therefore, the massive development of the bioweapons research by the German Army can be seen as part of an armament to prepare the ground for German Army operations outside of the NATO area.

Very little is publicly known about the biodefense research of the German Army. The defense ministry persistently refuses to publish facts and to face up to a critical discussion – despite the fact that the German Army is obviously not developing biobombs and killer bacteria, but is instead pursuing a defense reseach program. Offensive bioweapons research is prohibited in Germany, and there is no serious doubt that the German Army is obeying this prohibition. The defense ministry must urgently give up their policy of secrecy and guarantee the provision of comprehensive information to the broad public about all aspects of BW research.

This report presents information from a variety of public sources to give an overview on bioweapons research in Germany and to initiate a public debate about purpose and possible risks of these projects.

Ten million Deutschmarks was spent in 1999 for the "medical B-protection" by the defense ministry. This is a nearly 60% increase compared to 1994. Half of the money was spent on projects within the German Army, mainly at the "German Armed Forces Medical Academy” (Sanitätsakademie) in Munich and at the “German Armed Forces Scientific Institute for Protection Technologies NBC-Protection” (WIS) in Munster. It is possible that the Central Institute of the Medical Inspection of the German Army in Koblenz was also involved in biodefense research, although this was not included in the official notification of the German government to the Bioweapons Convention.

The other half of the B-budget was spent on contract research, mainly in universities. A variety of academic research partners of the Army could be identified, including the University of Munich, the Veterinary University in Hannover and the Universities of Hohenheim and Giessen.

The main objective of German biodefense research is the development of rapid early warning systems, which are considered to give the best protection against bioweapons. Another important aspect is the development of vaccines. Genetic engineering techniques are also used at the German army, apart from the B-research also in the area of chemical weapons decontamination and for irradiation. Last year, 15 biodefense projects involving genetic engineering were performed by the German Army or its contractors.

A variety of projects performed by the Army or its contractors raise serious questions. Biodefense research is especially problematic because of the dual-use problem. Near all know-how and any equipment that is needed for an offensive BW-program also has applications in civilian biomedical research. Only a very thin line separates offensive and defensive bioweapons research. Whether a given experiment is defensive or offensive is not qualified by objective criteria but only by the pursued purpose. Three examples from the german biodefense research:

In the early 1990s, the Frankfurt Battelle Institute developed a vaccination against botulinum toxin. Botulinum is a protein which is one of the most potent poisons. The vaccine consisted of the botulinum toxin that was inactivated by irradiation, i.e. for the production of the vaccine, large amounts of the toxin had to be produced. Indeed, the final report of the project contains a detailed recipe how to effectively produce several variants of the botulinum toxin. Hence, in the framework of biodefense research, a clear offensive potential was generated.

The German Armed Forces Medical Academy performs basic research on tularemia bacteria which is a typical BW-agent. One experiment involved genetically engineered bacteria containing a gene conferring resistance to antibiotics. Through this genetic manipulation, the bacteria were made a more suitable weapon because the modified tulariemia could no longer be treated with certain antibiotics.

Even vaccines have dual-use character. Under contract of the German Defense Ministry, the University of Hohenheim developes vaccines against anthrax and the University of Gießen develops vaccines against Clostridium perfringens toxin. Vaccines appear to be clearly defensive, however, if an aggressor wants to use a biological weapon, it must have a vaccine available to protect the own soldiers and population. The vaccination of an entire army - as currently done in the US against anthrax - could be taken as an indication of an offensive program. In addition, vaccines are unlikely to be an effective protection against the use of biological weapons, considering the large number and variations of BW agents.

These examples cannot not be taken as an indication that the German Armed Forces are developing a clandestine biological capability. Rather, they indicate how difficult – if not impossible – it is to draw a clear line between offensive and defensive research. Hitherto, the German Army appears to be ignorant about the "double-edgeness" of biodefense research. A thorough and public assessment of all projects is necessary in order to proscribe clear limits on biodefense research.

Genetic engineering work with BW agents deserves special critical scrutiny. To strengthen the global ban on biological weapon, it would be desirable to achieve a ban - or at least a control - of genetic engineering work that makes BW agents more suitable weapons (e.g., by transferring lethal factors or drug resistance). The German government must avoid setting precedents with research projects such as the antibiotic resistant tularemia.

A critical review of biodefense research cannot aim at prohibiting any kind of investigation in this area. On the other hand, the label "defensive" is by no means a sufficient criterion to accept any research in this area. Military bioweapons research needs tight limits, not least to avoid a new biological arms race. To date, the German Armed Forces have been acting largely without control and have been permitted room to maneuver through the policy of secrecy. This report contribute is to create transparency and to enable a broad public debate about the political goals, the risks of the dual-use research, and about the underlying threat assessments which are not based on the deployment of the army in battlefields far away from Germany.