Information concerning Southern Research Institute (Frederick, MD)
and the anthrax incident in Oakland, California
On June 10th, Childrens Hospital Oakland (California) announced that a shipment of "dead" anthrax sent to it by the Southern Research Institute (Frederick, Maryland location) in fact contained live bacteria. This error is reported to have resulted in the exposure of 5 to 7 laboratory workers to the bacteria. Believing that the anthrax was "killed", the workers handled the live agent with inadequate personal and environmental biosafety precautions.1. Biosafety Lapses at Southern Research Institute (SRI): It should be noted that, according to the minutes of the 26 November 2003 meeting of the SRI's Institutional Biosafety Committee (the last meeting before at least 10 March 2004 and, thus, the last before the anthrax was sent to California), SRI did not have a biosafety officer (BSO). With no BSO on its institutional biosafety committee, SRI stood in violation of federal biosafety guidelines. SRI was in further noncompliance because its biosafety committee did not have the two required community members (who SRI pays for their services). In fact, only four IBC members attended the meeting, representing a limited range of disciplines and interests. Click below for SRI's IBC meeting minutes.
Link: SRI IBC Meeting Minutes, 26 November 2003
While it is possible that SRI has another biosafety professional, not on the Institutional Biosafety Committee, who oversaw safety aspects of the anthrax production, the failures of the SRI IBC are very disturbing considering the government's plan to use Institutional Biosafety Committees as the primary review body to consider risky biodefense research (see: www.biosecurityboard.gov). In fact, in comparison to the range of tough issues that IBCs will be considering in this kind of dual-use research, growing a biosafety level three bacteria is a relatively easy task. Yet it was not accomplished safely.
(In addition, the redactions to the minutes - deletion of names of committee members - also violates research guidelines.)
2. Southern Research Institute's Facilities, Research, and Plans : Below a link is provided to a 26 slide presentation by Dr. Thomas Voss, Director of SRI's Homeland Security Division (established late 2001). This presentation was made on May 24th 2002 at the University of Alabama at Birmingham at a meeting in which university officials discussed biodefense research and weighed the possibility of entering a bid to construct a BSL-4 National Biocontainment Laboratory. They did not bid. The presentation provides substantial details about SRI programs and facilities, including its clients (DARPA, USAMRIID, USAMRMC, USAF, DTRA, NIAID, etc.), construction of new aerosol facilities, and desire to construct a BSL-4 facility.
Link: "Southern Research Institute, Homeland Security Division"
Presentation by Dr. Thomas Voss, 24 May 2002, Birmingham, AL (2.5 mb, PDF format)
3. Relevant Publication: The January 2004 article published by SRI and Childrens' Hospital authors in Immunology and Medical Microbiology (FEMS Immunology and Medical Microbiology 40 (2004) 231-237) should be noted.
• This article indicates that the particularly virulent Ames strain of anthrax was utilized in this research.
• This article also indicates that the research was partially funded by DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
We regret that we cannot post this article due to copyright issues.
4. SRI on pathogen shipment: In June 2002, Dr. David Franz, until recently the Vice President of Southern Research Institute for Chemical and Biological Defense, downplayed suggestions that procedures for shipment of dangerous pathogens might be improved: "I'm not prepared to say right now how we can improve that system without totally crippling our biomedical industry." See: http://www.thnt.com/thnt/story/0,21282,586147,00.html
5. SRI and Classified Research: SRI advertizes its involvement in classified research on biological weapons agents leading one to wonder if other mishaps have occured that have not been publicized due to secrecy:
"Security Clearance
Southern Research maintains a facility security clearance through Secret, and all staff members working in the chemical and biological defense areas have Secret clearances as well."