The Urgent Need for Cooperation Between the Cartagen Biosafety Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention

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Intergovernmental Committee for the Cartagena Protocol (ICCP-3)

PLENARY STATEMENT
22 April 2002

THE URGENT NEED FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE CARTAGENA
BIOSAFETY PROTOCOL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONTROL

Thank you, Mr. Chair,

With the anthrax attacks last year, biological weapons are on the minds of many people. Those deadly attacks were perpetrated with a natural form of the disease causing bacteria. With genetic engineering, the ways in which anthrax and many other agents can be used to cause harm is multiplied. Genetic engineering can be used in many hostile ways, to make biological weapons agents more deadly, harder to detect, resistant to treatment, or to evade vaccines. Genetically engineered weapons pose threats to all biodiversity. Working with diplomatic colleagues in arms control, the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol has a vital role in preventing the hostile use of biotechnology.

The dangers of genetically engineered biological weapons are not science fiction; but a deadly reality. Last year in Australia, researchers created a genetically engineered poxvirus that provides a blueprint for extraordinarily dangerous genetically engineered viruses. The United States government recently announced it will create genetically engineered anthrax, and its military scientists are building genetically engineered superbugs to attack materials. In preparation for field use, they are putting terminator technology into these material munching LMOs. The US has also created genetically engineered pathogens in its campaign to use biological weapons to eradicate illicit crops worldwide. Recently in the United Kingdom, researchers built and almost accidentally released a genetically engineered hybrid of the organisms that cause Hepatitis C and Dengue Fever. The effects and treatment regime of this GM disease are unknown; but British officials called it "more lethal than HIV". Also here in Europe, the German Army is working with biological weapons agents genetically engineered to resist antibiotics.

This is just a small list of examples. There are many more. For both the biotechnology regulator and the security expert, the dangers posed by genetically engineered organisms are very clear. This Protocol and arms control agreements share a common goal of preventing genetically engineered disasters. Averting the hostile use of genetic engineering and protecting biodiversity and human health are mutually supporting activities that should be pursued with the same legal framework nationally, regionally, and internationally. Africa has already taken an important step in this direction with its Model Law on Safety in Biotechnology. At the UN level, more can and needs to be done.

Biological weapons are prohibited by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which is 30 years old this month, and which has 144 States Parties. Under the Convention, the development, stockpiling, acquisition, and transfer of biological weapons are illegal. On paper, the Biological Weapons Convention is strong. The Biosafety Protocol is a new agreement gathering ratifications for entry into force. Genetic engineering has presented the Biological Weapons Convention with serious problems. These have been recognized in interventions and written submissions by States Parties, including strong apprehensions expressed by Northern, even NATO, countries. Discussions at the Biological Weapons Convention are drawing increasing attention to what the Biosafety Protocol can do to help prevent abuse of genetic engineering. And here at the CBD too. Last week, the Youth Conference called on this Convention to prevent hostile use of GMOs, and the dangers of biological weapons were raised at the Ministers' meeting.

There are important commonalities between the Biosafety Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention. There are strong parallels between the Precautionary Approach and the Biological Weapons Convention's "general purpose criterion", which prohibits any development of agents for hostile use. Like the Precautionary Approach, the Biological Weapons Convention does not prohibit specific agents, but instead applies a key principle of caution to all scientific research with agents that can be used in a hostile manner. The import and export supervision responsibilities of the Competent Authority directly relate to States Partiesâ non-proliferation commitments under the Biological Weapons Convention. There are other important relationships, detailed in our paper here and, later today, in a lunchtime seminar.

The Biosafety Protocol's relationship to arms control should be addressed by:

- exchanging observer status between the Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention;
- the undertaking of a Biosafety Protocol study of its relationship to biological weapons control and how it can avert hostile use of genetic engineering;
- development of a cooperative Program of Work with the Biological Weapons Convention to prevent the hostile use of GMOs, and;
- capacity building for the Biosafety Protocol that includes components dedicated to the relationship between biosafety and biological weapons control.

The adoption of the Biosafety Protocol was welcomed by the disarmament community. This Protocol's relationship to the Biological Weapons Convention and the role that this agreement can play in assisting implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention has been recognized by many governments, including cooperation proposed by Mexico, Peru, France, Italy, and other countries. The Non-Aligned Movement, at the Biological Weapons Convention, has proposed capacity building and technology transfer in cooperation with the Convention on Biological Diversity. My NGO and others applaud the important proposals from Latin American countries to develop the means to implement the Biological Weapons Convention and the Biosafety Protocol together. Copies of this information is here for your review.

It is time to move into action, and for ICCP to embrace its cooperative role with arms control to prevent abuse of genetic engineering. No legal framework on risks of genetically modified organisms is complete or will be effective without addressing some of their most serious potential consequences, their hostile use against biodiversity, agriculture, animals, people, and even the infrastructure necessary for modern life.

To begin this vital process, we urge this meeting of the ICCP to request the Secretariat to prepare a study of the Biosafety Protocolâs relationship to biological weapons control, and for the ICCP to direct the Secretariat to apply for observer status and to send representation to the next meeting of the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva this November. This ICCP should lay the groundwork for a cooperative program of work with the Biological Weapons Convention to prevent hostile use of genetically engineered organisms. We urge you to take these simple steps to help create greater biosafety and security for the world.