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The CCD Debate: Treaty Talks with Little Room for Maneuver.

The 1975-76 negotiation of ENMOD was a process in which the United Nations actually negotiated very little. This is because multilateral discussion of ENMOD was based on a draft treaty developed by only two countries: the United States and the Soviet Union. While most governments wanted a much stronger treaty, geopolitics as they were, with the two superpowers in emphatic agreement on a weaker Convention, other govenments had little room for maneuver.

Although the result was disappointing, the process began well enough. At the 29th Session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1974, the USSR introduced a draft treaty that pleased most countries because it was very wide in scope. The initial Soviet proposal established a comprehensive ban on research and development of all hostile environmental modification techniques, with no loopholes to permit limited use of environmental modification in war. The Soviet text read: "The Parties would undertake never under any circumstance to resort to any means of influencing the environment, the climate or to carry out preparations for their use."

The Soviet proposal was adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 3264 (XXIX), which passed with no dissenting votes and only five abstentions (including the US). The resolution attached the Soviet draft convention and charged the Geneva-based Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) with the task of negotiating a final text.

Between December 1974 and August 1975, the US and USSR conducted sercret bilateral negotiations on ENMOD. In July and August of 1975, the CCD began to discuss environmental modification; but only heard experts and did not begin to debate the Soviet text. By August 1975, the superpowers had agreed on a new draft treaty which much more restricted in scope than the initial Soviet proposal.

The superpowers simultaneously submitted their draft treaty to the CCD on 21 August 1975 (download here). The new draft (called the "identical texts")shifted the basis of CCD negotiations to the bilateral US/USSR formulation rather than the initial Soviet proposal which had been transmitted by the General Assembly.

When the CCD took up the identical texts, many countries expressed their disappointment at the new language. In essence, the superpowers position was that all major debate and compromising had already been made in their private talks. The Soviet and US alliance effectively required the world to accept the joint text if a treaty prohibiting environmental warfare was to come into existence.

Less than 30 countries took part in the negotiation of ENMOD at the CCD. The composition of the group reflected, to a large extent, the polarized Cold War world. Few "non-aligned" countries attended the negotiations, and Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia were poorly represented.

While the Geneva-based CCD was considering the US-USSR text in late 1975, ENMOD was again on the agenda of UNGA's 30th Session across the Atlantic in New York. On 11 December 1975, UNGA approved Resolution 3475 (XXX). The resolution requested the CCD to continue its negotiations, "bearing in mind existing proposals and suggestions, as well as relevant discussion by the General Assembly" (A/C.1/31/8; p. 6). The phrasing of General Assembly's second directive to the CCD reflected simmering frustration with superpower inflexibility on the treaty text. The last phrase - "as well as relevant discussion by the General Assembly" - was indicative of the concern of a number of delegations (led by Mexico) who feared that the superpower draft would result in a treaty that permitted some forms of environmental warfare.

The fears of Mexico and its allies proved to be justified. Although many states expressed their dissatisfaction, the text that eventually emerged from the CCD was indeed at odds with the initial Soviet draft and UNGA Resoltion 3264 (XXIX), which contemplated a treaty to prohibit all environmental warfare. The Soviets and Americans had permitted few changes to their joint draft, a text inserted weaknesses into the treaty that were never excised, including:

--> a higher damage threshold for activities to amount to a violation: widespread, long-lasting or severe (known as the troika);

--> limiting applicability of the treaty to parties only, and;

--> a complaint and verification procedure subject to the Security Council.

The CCD never achieved consensus on the ENMOD Convention. Despite this, it transmitted the draft text to the General Assembly on 2 September 1976. UNGA took up the CCD's draft in November. Dissenting states took advantage of the larger, more open forum of the General Assembly to express dissatisfaction with the treaty and its negotiation process. Kuwait's General Assembly intervention was typical of the dissenters: "A large number of States requested the omission of the [troika]. The authors of the draft convention have shown utter disregard for this view and faced us with a fait accompli" (A/C.1.31/PV.51; p. 33).

China, another dissenter, denounced the superpowers: "the Committee [has] once again revealed a super-Power's arrogance... Whenever they reach agreement on any sham disarmament treaty the two super-Powers demand that other countries immediately accept and sign it, without allowing them even the right to express their views." (A/C.1.31/PV.51, pp. 41).

Other countries, among them France, were unhappy with the treaty; but did not stand in its way, reasoning that moving on to other disarmament matters was more important, and that little would be accomplished by continuing debate at the CCD.


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