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Article V

1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. These international procedures may include the services of appropriate international organizations, as well as of a Consultative Committee of Experts as provided for in paragraph 2 of this article.

2. For the purposes set forth in paragraph 1 of this article, the Depositary shall, within one month of the receipt of a request from any State Party to this Convention, convene a Consultative Committee of Experts. Any State Party may appoint an expert to the Committee whose functions and rules of procedure are set out in the annex, which constitutes an integral part of this Convention. The Committee shall transmit to the Depositary a summary of its findings of fact, incorporating all views and information presented to the Committee during its proceedings. The Depositary shall distribute the summary to all States Parties.

3. Any State Party to this Convention which has reason to believe that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all relevant information as well as all possible evidence supporting its validity.

4. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties of the results of the investigation.

5. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Convention.


The complaint procedure established in the US-USSR draft of Article V was almost as bitterly opposed as their introduction of the troika into Article I. Many countries, including Sweden, Romania, Japan, Argentina, Pakistan, Italy, West Germany and Mexico were not happy with the role assigned to the Security Council in the complaints procedure, arguing that the veto power of permanent members undermined the equality of all Parties.

The recently approved Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was used as a justification for giving the Security Council the responsibility of dealing with complaints. Not all parties to the BTWC, however, had been supportive of that treaty's complaint procedure. Sweden, The Netherlands and Italy proposed lifting the veto power when deciding over disputes (here Sweden):

We have always considered this feature of the Biological Weapons Convention as an unfortunate relapse into unequal treaty relations. Provided that the political will exits -common, I think to all States non-permanent members of the Security Council- the deficiency could, in our view, easily be remedied if the initiation of an investigation by the Security Council is seen as a procedural matter for which the right of veto would not apply. This principle should be stated in Article V.2. (CCD/PV.697; 25 March 1976, pp. 25-26).

According to West Germany:

We have emphasized that provision must be made to ensure that it cannot be blocked by the veto of the permanent members of the Security Council... arms controls treaties which do not provide for a proper verification procedure, but simply for complaints to be lodged with the United Nations Security Council can hardly claim to have made available the necessary instruments to ensure verification. One example along these lines is the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons [BTWC]... we do not envisage the complaints procedure provided for in that Convention as a model for future arms control treaties, and we regret that... the present draft convention on the prohibition of environmental warfare. adopt[s] the procedures provided for in the [BTWC]. (CCD/PV.697; 25 March 1976, p. 12)

The Netherlands proposed transferring the fact-finding powers to the Secretary General, assisted by a Committee of Experts. The Committee of Experts was given a fact-finding role, although the final decision was still left to the Security Council, as proposed by the US and Soviet Union. The Dutch proposal also included functions concerning the implementation of the treaty for the Committee of Experts, such as an assessing implementation of the Convention:

My government would prefer that the Secretary-General of the United Nations be given the fact-finding powers which we need in this convention. The Secretary-General could be assisted by experts coming from relevant specialized agencies and scientific organizations... proposals of this kind were also made during the negotiations of the Biological Weapons Convention but were not generally approved by the Committee. Keeping this in mind, I perhaps make the suggestion that a Committee, consisting of parties to the treaty, could perhaps assist the Secretary-General in his fact-finding task. The powers of this Committee need not to be spelled out too much in the treaty itself. Parties could direct complaints either to the Secretary-General and/or the committee and all parties would accept the obligation to co-operate with [both]. The committee would take decisions by majority of votes or, if that is to be preferred, by a two-third majority. The committee could also advise the Secretary-General on the steps to be taken after a complaint is investigated, for example to report to the Security Council. The committee could also make preparation for the regular review conferences and report to these conferences on the implementation of the treaty. (CCD/PV.692; 9 March 1976, p. 34-35)

The Dutch proposal for the creation of the Committee of Experts was a compromise solution; but the additional roles proposed by the Netherlands that would have made the committee a more permanent institution were not accepted. Instead, the Committee of Experts was approved as an ad hoc entity, to be convened when a complaint was lodged. An annex was added to the Convention to provide some guidance on the Committee's organization and functions:

ANNEX TO THE CONVENTION

Consultative Committee of Experts

1. The Consultative Committee of Experts shall undertake to make appropriate findings of fact and provide expert views relevant to any problem raised pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article V of this Convention by the State Party requesting the convening of the Committee.

2. The work of the Consultative Committee of Experts shall be organized in such a way as to permit it to perform the functions set forth in paragraph 1 of this annex. The Committee shall decide procedural questions relative to the organization of its work, where possible by consensus, but otherwise by a majority of those present and voting. There shall be no voting on matters of substance.

3. The Depositary or his representative shall serve as the Chairman of the Committee.

4. Each expert may be assisted at meetings by one or more advisers.

5. Each expert shall have the right, through the Chairman, to request from States, and from international organizations, such information and assistance as the expert considers desirable for the accomplishment of the Committees work.

 

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