Open Letters on Laboratory Secrecy
To the Leadership of the Proposed Western National Center for Biodefense (University of California at Davis, 10 February)
To the Leadership of the University of Texas Medical Branch Center for Biodefense (18 February)
To the Leadership of the Proposed Rocky Mountain Laboratories BioSafety Level 4 facility (26 February)
10 February 2003
Dr. Lynn Chronister
Dr. Frederick A. Murphy
Western National Center for Biodefense
Fifth Floor Mrak Hall
University of California
One Shields Avenue
Davis, California 95616Dear Drs. Chronister and Murphy,
Among the most important and urgent issues raised by recent trends to expand the biodefense research capacity within the United States is ensuring full public transparency of BSL-3 and 4 laboratories conducting this research. Secrecy in research on biological weapons agents is dangerous for many reasons. It prevents local communities from understanding the activities of laboratories and what dangers they may pose, including domestic terrorism, accidents, and other dangerous missteps, such as the recent one involving plague samples at Texas Tech University, another institution that seeks a Biosafety Level 4 laboratory for biodefense research.
Secrecy is indicative of possible prohibited activity at any facility handling biological weapons agents. When biodefense experiments operate under wraps, our own citizens and other countries, some suspicious of the United States, are left guessing as to the nature of experiments conducted, potentially triggering a destructive cycle of ever more provocative biodefense experiments. In fact, this process may already be underway, further bending the already stressed lines between offensive and defensive research.
While the United States has renounced biological weapons and ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), in 2001 it unilaterally blocked the creation of a multilateral inspection system for laboratories such as the proposed Western National Center for Biodefense. The decision of the United States to reject international declaration of its biodefense activities and not allow inspections of biodefense laboratories angered even our closest allies, and has increased the burden on organizations such as ours, who seek safety and security in the midst of a deteriorating arms control situation.
The US sabotage of the BWC Verification Protocol was shortly followed by dramatic reports of secret and highly provocative US activities, including the construction of an anthrax production plant in Nevada, the genetic engineering of anthrax to evade existing vaccine protections, and the manufacture of biological submunition (bomblet) prototypes. While these experiments are described as defensive, a number of experts in biological weapons control believe that US rejection of the declaration and inspection of biodefense facilities is, in fact, due to new, classified US programs that violate the BWC. Though your institution may give a good faith pledge to not conduct research that could be construed as offensive, conducting any secret research levels suspicion upon your institution. Furthermore, secrecy makes it substantially easier to compartmentalize research projects, allowing scientists to proceed without accepting responsibility for the end product. This is what occurred within Divisions of the Manhattan project that allowed for the creation of the atom bomb.
We understand that the Western National Center for Biodefense does not propose to conduct biological weapons experiments that violate law. In the context of US rejection of inspections and conduct of classified experiments with biological weapon agents, however, greater assurances must be available to citizens and the international public. A more explicit and unequivocal commitment is required from US biodefense laboratories in order to restore and maintain public and international trust.
We therefore call upon you, as coordinators of the proposed Western National Center for Biodefense, to commit your laboratory, in writing, to the following safeguards:
1. That under no circumstances will any classified research be conducted by any Western National Center for Biodefense researcher or any person granted access to your laboratory;
2. That the Western National Center for Biodefense will maintain a fully transparent Biosafety Committee that will review and (dis)approve all projects to be conducted in the BL3 and BL4 facilities, and that all Biosafety Committee documentation will be made concurrently available to the entire public, and that any member of the public will have the right to attend all portions of all committee meetings;
3. That the Western National Center for Biodefense will maintain an online or publicly-inspectable record of all experiments conducted in the BL3/BL4 facilities to include the names of the investigators, a copy of the research proposal, and a detailed description of the procedures conducted, including results and the scientific names and quantities of all agent(s) utilized including, when applicable, descriptions of any transformants used.
4. That the Western National Center for Biodefense will maintain an online or publicly-inspectable record of all agents entering or exiting the lab and an up-to-date account of all organisms, and quantities thereof, present in the laboratory;
5. That in order to promote public understanding of its activities and to ensure public health, the Western National Center for Biodefense will maintain an online or publicly-inspectable record of the complete vaccination status of all persons with access to the laboratory.
Your laboratory is one of more than three dozen new BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs presently proposed for construction or upgrading in the United States. The undersigned organizations are seeking similar commitments from other laboratory proponents. By making this pledge in writing and without qualifications, the Western National Center for Biodefense can begin to move towards restoring trust that has been violated in its inadequate, eleventh-hour attempts to gain public support.
Please send your response to Marylia Kelley, Executive Director, Tri-Valley CAREs, 2582 Old First St, Livermore, CA 94551, fax: (925) 443-0177.
Sincerely,
Steve Erickson, Executive Director
Citizens Education Project
Salt Lake City, UTMary Wulff, Coordinator
Coalition for a Safe Lab
Hamilton, MTGreg Mello, Director
Los Alamos Study Group
Santa Fe, NMColin King, Research Director
Nuclear Watch of New Mexico
Santa Fe, NMRobert M. Gould, MD, President
Robert K. Musil, Ph.D.,M.P.H. Executive Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility
Washington, DCEdward Hammond, Director
The Sunshine Project
Austin, TXMarylia Kelley, Executive Director
Tri-Valley CAREs (Communities Against a Radioactive Environment)
Livermore, CAAndrew Lichterman, Program Director
Western States Legal Foundation
Oakland, CA
An Open Letter to the Leadership of the University of Texas Medical Branch Center for Biodefense
18 February 2003
Dr. C.J. Peters
Department of Microbiology & Immunology and Pathology
Center for Biodefense
University of Texas Medical Branch
Keiller Building, Room 3.152
Galveston, Texas 77555-0609By fax and electronic mail
Dear Dr. Peters,
Among the most important and urgent issues raised by the expansion of biodefense research capacity within the United States is ensuring full public transparency of BSL-3 and 4 laboratories conducting this research. Secrecy in research on biological weapons agents is dangerous for many reasons. It prevents local communities from understanding the activities of laboratories and what dangers they may pose, including domestic terrorism, accidents, and other dangerous missteps, such as the recent one involving plague samples at Texas Tech University, another institution that seeks a Biosafety Level 4 laboratory for biodefense research, and a UTMB partner in its pursuit of a Regional Center of Excellence.
Secrecy is indicative of possible prohibited activity at any facility handling biological weapons agents. When biodefense experiments operate under wraps, our own citizens and other countries, some suspicious of the United States, are left guessing as to the nature of experiments conducted, potentially triggering a destructive cycle of ever more provocative biodefense experiments. In fact, this process may already be underway, further bending the already stressed lines between offensive and defensive research.
While the United States has renounced biological weapons and ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), in 2001 it unilaterally blocked the creation of a multilateral inspection system for laboratories such as the UTMB Center for Biodefense. The decision of the United States to reject international declaration of its biodefense activities and not allow inspections of biodefense laboratories angered even our closest allies, and has increased the burden on organizations such as ours, who seek safety and security in the midst of a deteriorating arms control situation.
The US sabotage of the BWC Verification Protocol was shortly followed by dramatic reports of secret and highly provocative US activities, including the construction of an anthrax production plant in Nevada, the genetic engineering of anthrax to evade existing vaccine protections, and the manufacture of biological submunition (bomblet) prototypes. While these experiments are described as defensive, a number of experts in biological weapons control believe that US rejection of the declaration and inspection of biodefense facilities is, in fact, due to new, classified US programs that violate the BWC. Though your institution may give a good faith pledge to not conduct research that could be construed as offensive, conducting any secret research levels suspicion upon your institution. Furthermore, secrecy makes it substantially easier to compartmentalize research projects, allowing scientists to proceed without accepting responsibility for the end product. This is what occurred within Divisions of the Manhattan project that allowed for the creation of the atom bomb.
We understand that the UTMB Center for Biodefense does not propose to conduct biological weapons experiments that violate law. In the context of US rejection of inspections and conduct of classified experiments with biological weapon agents, however, greater assurances must be available to citizens and the international public.
Prior to groundbreaking of the BSL-4 facility, in July 2001, you addressed a UTMB Town Meeting to describe the activities of the then-proposed laboratory. At this meeting, you stated that "We won't be doing anything classified or secret. It will be wide open and above board." The important commitment not only assured the public that UTMB would not engage in classified research; but also that all activities in its laboratories would be transparent – "wide open and above board" – with full details available to the public.
On 16 September 2002, the Sunshine Project wrote to UTMB seeking written reiteration of your public pledge. It took two and half months for UTMB to produce a short reply. In fact, UTMB did not respond at all until several letters had been sent, including copies to UT System management and an indication that the Sunshine Project was prepared to address this issue with journalists.
In its unacceptably delayed response UTMB stated "we at The University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston have no plans for classified research projects in the existing labs or in the BSL4 laboratories under construction." This statement abandons – even negates - UTMB’s prior public commitment. It does not contain a categorical pledge of no classified work, instead reducing the commitment so it applies only to UTMB’s current "plans" (as of that time). Nor does UTMB's letter contain any commitment of transparency that applies to outside researchers granted access to UTMB facilities. Nor does the statement clearly address activities in additional new laboratory space recently proposed to NIAID.
In light of UTMB's backpedaling and the deterioration of international confidence in the nature of research conducted in the US biodefense program, public trust and accountability must be established through a more explicit and unequivocal commitment.
We therefore call upon you, as Director of the UTMB Center for Biodefense, to commit your laboratory, in writing, to the following safeguards:
1. That under no circumstances will any classified research be conducted by any UTMB Center for Biodefense researcher or any person granted access to your laboratory;
2. That the UTMB Center for Biodefense will maintain a fully transparent Biosafety Committee that will review and (dis)approve all projects to be conducted in the BL3 and BL4 facilities, and that all Biosafety Committee documentation will be made concurrently available to the entire public, and that any member of the public will have the right to attend all portions of all committee meetings;
3. That the UTMB Center for Biodefense will maintain an online or publicly-inspectable record of all experiments conducted in the BL3/BL4 facilities to include the names of the investigators, a copy of the research proposal, and a detailed description of the procedures conducted, including results and the scientific names and quantities of all agent(s) utilized including, when applicable, descriptions of any transformants used.
4. That the UTMB Center for Biodefense will maintain an online or publicly-inspectable record of all agents entering or exiting the lab and an up-to-date account of all organisms, and quantities thereof, present in the laboratory;
5. That in order to promote public understanding of its activities and to ensure public health, the UTMB Center for Biodefense will maintain an online or publicly-inspectable record of the complete vaccination status of all persons with access to the laboratory.
Your laboratory is one of more than three dozen biodefense BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs presently proposed for construction or upgrading in the United States. The undersigned organizations are seeking similar commitments from other laboratory proponents. By making this pledge in writing and without qualifications, the UTMB Center for Biodefense can restore the trust it was working to establish before abandoning its transparency commitment.
Please send your response to Edward Hammond, Director, The Sunshine Project, 101 West 6th St #607, Austin, TX 78701, fax: (512) 494-0545.
Sincerely,
Steve Erickson, Executive Director
Citizens Education Project
Salt Lake City, UTMary Wulff, Coordinator
Coalition for a Safe Lab
Hamilton, MTGreg Mello, Director
Los Alamos Study Group
Santa Fe, NMColin King, Research Director
Nuclear Watch of New Mexico
Santa Fe, NMRobert M. Gould, MD, President
Robert K. Musil, Ph.D.,M.P.H. Executive Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility
Washington, DCEdward Hammond, Director
The Sunshine Project
Austin, TXMarylia Kelley, Executive Director
Tri-Valley CAREs (Communities Against a Radioactive Environment)
Livermore, CAAndrew Lichterman, Program Director
Western States Legal Foundation
Oakland, CA
cc: Dr. Mark G. Yudof, Chancellor
Dr. James C. Guckian, Acting Executive Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs
Dr. John D. Stobo, President, UTMB
An Open Letter to the Leadership of the Proposed Rocky Mountain Laboratories BioSafety Level 4 facility.
February 26, 2003
Dr. Marshall Bloom
Rocky Mountain Laboratories
903 S. 4th
Hamilton, MT 59840Dear Dr. Bloom,
We, as the signatories to this letter, write you to detail some of the most significant issues related to Rocky Mountain Laboratories. Among the most important and urgent issues exposed by the recent trends to expand the biodefense research capacity within the United States is that of ensuring that BSL3 and BSL4 laboratories conducting this research are fully accessible and visible to the public. Full public transparency allows local communities to understand the activities of these new laboratories. Moreover, it prevents misperceptions of the dangers the labs may pose, including the potential for domestic terrorism or accidents.
We understand that the Rocky Mountain Laboratories does not propose to conduct biological weapons experiments that are offensive in nature or that violate law. However, we would be more comfortable if greater assurances with respect to accessibility to the research were available to citizens.
Therefore we call upon you, as associate director of Rocky Mountain Laboratories, to commit your laboratory, in writing, to the following safeguards. That:
1.Under no circumstances will any classified research be conducted by any Rocky Mountain Laboratories researcher or any person granted access to your laboratory;
2. Rocky Mountain Laboratories will maintain a fully accessible Biosafety Committee that will review all projects to be conducted in the BL3 and BL4 facilities, that Rocky Mountain Laboratories will make all Biosafety Committee documentation available to the entire public, and that Rocky Mountain Labs will provide any member of the public the right to attend committee meetings in their entirety;
3. Rocky Mountain Laboratories will maintain an online or publicly-inspectable record of all experiments conducted in the BL3/BL4 facilities, to include the names of the investigators, a copy of the research proposals, and a detailed description of the procedures conducted, including results and the scientific names and quantities of all agent(s) utilized.
4. Rocky Mountain Laboratories will maintain an online or publicly-inspectable record of all agents entering or exiting the lab and an up-to-date account of all organisms, and quantities thereof, present in the laboratory;
5. In order to promote public understanding of its activities and to ensure public health, Rocky Mountain Laboratories will maintain an online or publicly-inspectable record of the complete vaccination status of all persons with access to the laboratory.
Rocky Mountain Laboratories is one of more than three dozen new BSL-3 and/or BSL-4 labs presently proposed for construction or upgrading in the United States. The undersigned organizations are seeking similar commitments from other laboratory proponents. By making this pledge in writing, the Rocky Mountain Laboratories will provide a significant public assurance and will, at the same time, begin a move towards establishing greater public trust and support.
Sincerely,
Mary Wulff, Coordinator
Coalition for a Safe Lab
PO Box 1803
Hamilton, MT 59840Jim Miller, President
Friends of the Bitterroot
Hamilton, MTSteve Erickson, Executive Director
Citizens Education Project
Salt Lake City, UTGreg Mello, Director
Los Alamos Study Group
Santa Fe, NMColin King, Research Director
Nuclear Watch of New Mexico
Santa Fe, NMRobert M. Gould, MD, President
Robert K. Musil, Ph.D.,M.P.H. Executive Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility
Washington, DCEdward Hammond, Director
The Sunshine Project
Austin, TXMarylia Kelley, Executive Director
Tri-Valley CAREs (Communities Against a Radioactive Environment)
Livermore, CAJacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director;
Andrew Lichterman, Program Director,
Western States Legal Foundation.
Oakland, CA
An Open Letter to the Leadership of the Boston University National Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases and Biodefense
March 17, 2003
Mark S. Klempner, M.D.
Assistant Provost for Research
Boston University Medical Campus
Conrad Wesselhoeft Professor of Medicine
Vice Chair for Research
Department of Medicine
715 Albany Street
Boston, MA 02118Dear Dr. Klempner,
The current expansion of research on biological weapons agents raises important challenges to our nation’s safety and security, as well as our commitment to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Chief among these issues is the need to ensure full public transparency and disclosure of research conducted at Biosafety Level (BSL) 3 and 4 laboratories. Secrecy
prevents local residents, policymakers, and the international community from evaluating the risks of biological weapons research. Handling dangerous pathogens creates grave risks: domestic terrorism, exposure of researchers to infectious disease, and accidents caused by breakdowns in biological containment. The recent failure of containment systems at the Plum Island infectious disease laboratory should indicate the severity of these safety concerns.Classified biodefense experiments raise suspicions at home and abroad. In particular, there is widespread concern that offensive capabilities will be produced in the process of vaccine development and other defensive work. Such concerns can only be allayed if these projects are openly declared. Our nation’s credibility and leadership on international arms control is undermined by initiatives that bring into question the integrity of our commitments. Secrecy sets a dangerous precedent for other countries considering undisclosed research, potentially triggering a destructive cycle of covert biological weapons development.
Though the United States renounced biological weapons by ratifying the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC) nearly three decades ago, the Bush Administration in 2001 blocked the creation of a multilateral inspection system for laboratories such as the proposed BU National Center for Biodefense. The decision of the U.S. to reject international declaration of its biodefense activities has angered our closest allies, and increased the burden on non-governmental organizations to provide oversight of domestic treaty compliance in the midst of a deteriorating arms control situation.
The United States’ derailment of the BWC Verification Protocol was shortly followed by dramatic reports in the New York Times and Baltimore Sun of secret and highly provocative US activities, including the construction of an anthrax production plant in Nevada, the genetic engineering of anthrax to evade existing vaccines, and the manufacture of biological submunition (bomblet) prototypes. While these experiments are described as defense, a number of experts in biological weapons control and former government officials have publicly stated their belief that U.S. rejection of the declaration and inspection of biodefense facilities is, in fact, due to new, classified U.S. programs that violate the BWC. Though your institution may give a good faith pledge to not conduct research that could be construed as defensive, conducting any secret research levels suspicion upon your
institution.We understand that Boston University’s National Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases and Biodefenses does not propose to conduct biological weapons experiments that violate international law. However, in the context of America’s rejection of inspections and conduct of classified experiments with biological weapons agents, greater assurances and mechanisms of accountability must be available to citizens and the international public.
The BU Medical Center claims on its website that it “has been reaching out to community leaders, business leaders and others local residents to open communications about the [biodefense] project and address any concerns.” The Council for Responsible Genetics is not convinced of the sincerity of this commitment. First, there have been no public meetings scheduled for surrounding neighborhoods, and citizens of the wider Boston region, to voice their concerns about the proposed BSL 4 construction project. Second, the “surveys” of surrounding residents that BU Medical Center has used to bolster its claim of community support for the laboratory are misleading and unscientific. Respondents report being promised, with little substantiation, that the laboratory would protect the health of the city in the case of a bioterrorist attack. The citizens of Boston deserve to be brought into an honest and open dialogue over the potential costs and benefits of this facility, not merely bombarded with an aggressive propaganda campaign.
It is critical that the public have full access to information on the activities scheduled to be conducted at the new BSL 4 facility. The BU National Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases and Biodefenses will be one of the first such laboratories to be located in a major urban area. Given these concerns, neighboring cities have already passed ordinances to explicitly prevent BSL 4 research. Without the availability of complete information, it will be impossible for all parties involved to make an adequate assessment of the costs and benefits of the current proposal. In light of the local and international uncertainties on the nature and advisability of US biodefense research, public trust and accountability must be established through a more explicit and unequivocal commitment.
We therefore call up on you, as the Assistant Provost for Research, to commit your laboratory, in writing, to the following safeguards:
1. That under no circumstances will any classified research be conducted by any BU National Center for Biodefense researcher or any person granted access to your laboratory;
2. That the BU Medical Center will maintain a fully transparent Biosafety Committee that will review and approve/disapprove all projects to be conducted in the BL3 and BL4 facilities, and that all Biosafety Committee documentation will be made concurrently available to the entire public, and that any member of the public will have the right to attend all portions of all committee meetings;
3. That the BU National Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases and Biodefenses will maintain an online or publicly-inspectable record of all experiments conducted in the BSL 3/ BSL 4 facilities to include the names of the investigators, a copy of the research proposal, and a detailed description of the procedures conducted, including results and the scientific names and quantities of all agent(s) utilized including, when applicable, descriptions of any transformants used;
4. That the BU National Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases and Biodefenses will maintain an online or publicly-inspectable record of all agents entering or exiting the lab and an up-to-date account of all organisms, and quantities thereof, present in the laboratory;
5. That in order to promote public understanding of its activities and to ensure public health, the BU National Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases and Biodefenses will maintain an online or publicly-inspectable record of the complete vaccination status of all persons with access to the laboratory.
Your laboratory is one of more than three dozen new BSL 3 and BSL 4 labs presently proposed for construction or upgrading in the United States. The undersigned organizations are seeking similar commitments from other laboratory proponents. By making this pledge in writing and without qualifications, the BU Medical Center can begin the process of establishing
public trust and accountability.
Please send your response to Peter Shorett, Director of Programs, Council for Responsible Genetics, 5 Upland Road, Suite 3, Cambridge, MA 02140. Phone (617) 868-0870, Fax: (617) 491-5344.
Sincerely,
Sujatha Byravan, Ph.D., Executive Director
Peter Shorett, Director of Programs
Council for Responsible Genetics
Cambridge, MAEdward Hammond, Director
The Sunshine Project
Austin, TXRobert K. Musil, Ph.D, M.P.H, Executive Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility
Washington, DCWinston Weeks, Research Specialist
Citizens Education Project
Salt Lake City, UTGreg Mello, Director
Los Alamos Study Group
Santa Fe, NMMarylia Kelley, Executive Director
Tri-Valley CAREs
(Communities Against a Radioactive Environment)
Livermore, CAMary Wulff, Coordinator
Coalition for a Safe Lab
Hamilton, MTColin King, Research Director
Nuclear Watch of New Mexico
Santa Fe, NMJacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director
Andrew Lichterman, Program Director
Western States Legal Foundation
Oakland, CA